Security Council Strongly Condemns Terrorist Attacks, Other Violations in Lake Chad Basin Region, Unanimously Adopting Resolution 2349 (2017)

Egypt Calls for Full Participation in Negotiations as Russian Federation Says Text Wrongly Defines Situation as ‘Conflict’

The Security Council adopted its first resolution addressing Boko Haram’s presence in the Lake Chad Basin today, expressing concern about the protection needs of civilians affected by terrorism, including those resulting from sexual exploitation and abuse, extra-judicial killings and torture.

Unanimously adopting resolution 2349 (2017), the Council strongly condemned all terrorist attacks, violations of international humanitarian law and human rights abuses by Boko Haram and Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL/Da’esh) in the region, including killings, abductions, child, early and forced marriage, rape, sexual slavery and the increasing use of girls as suicide bombers.  Those responsible must be held to account and brought to justice.

By other terms, the Council encouraged Governments to enhance regional military cooperation, and to move “vigorously and decisively” to cut funding flows to individuals, groups, undertakings and entities on the ISIL and Al-Qaida Sanctions List, including Boko Haram.  It urged Lake Chad Basin Governments to implement consistent policies to promote defections from Boko Haram and ISIL, to deradicalize and reintegrate those who had already defected, and to ensure there was no impunity for those responsible for terrorist attacks.

On the humanitarian front, the Council urged all parties to the conflict to ensure respect for and protection of humanitarian personnel, and to facilitate safe, timely and unhindered access for humanitarian organizations to deliver aid.  In terms of follow-up, the Council encouraged the Secretary-General to carry out a joint visit to the Lake Chad Basin region with the Chairperson of the African Union Commission, the President of the World Bank Group and the President of the African Development Bank.

In the ensuing discussion, delegates welcomed the Council’s unity in passing the resolution on the heels of its mission to Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Nigeria from 2 to 7 March to better understand the conflict’s root causes.  Several urged the quick disbursement of funds pledged at the Oslo Humanitarian Conference on Nigeria and the Lake Chad Region, held on 24 February.

Cameroon’s representative, speaking on behalf of the Lake Chad Basin Commission, described the resolution as a “step change” in mobilizing international support for countries to combat Boko Haram.  “We are fighting against terrorism,” he stressed, noting that the military response, while essential, should be part of a holistic approach.  He pressed States to adopt and implement measures to tackle the causes and consequences of the current situation, expressing hope that the resolution would mark the start of more decisive support to regional countries, which had been forced to curtail spending on education, health and other efforts.

In similar vein, Nigeria’s representative welcomed the resolution’s call for enhanced regional military cooperation and coordination, emphasizing that his country was resolute in its efforts to defeat terrorism.  The people of the Lake Chad Basin needed support, he said, pointing out that shrinking of Lake Chad had exacerbated their hardship, with cross-border knock-on effects making it difficult for Governments to meet people’s needs.

Senegal’s representative welcomed the resolution as “the first of its kind”, with its pledge to support the efforts of Lake Chad Basin countries to combat Boko Haram, and in so doing, to resolve the humanitarian crisis sparked in 2009 by that group’s activities.

Other speakers, while having joined the consensus, took issue with the Council’s working methods, with the Russian Federation’s representative emphasizing that the resolution had been rushed through under the United Kingdom Presidency.  It did not recognize the irresponsible policy of interference by some States in the affairs of others, he pointed out, while also describing the text as “unrefined” in its description of the Lake Chad Basin situation as a “conflict”, when, in fact, it was of a counter-terrorism nature.

Egypt’s delegate also underlined the need for full participation by all Council members, notably those from Africa, when discussing issues on the continent.  The Council must take the concerns and proposals of all countries on board to avoid unacceptable interference in internal State affairs, he added.

The United Kingdom’s representative added:  “We will fail the people of the region if we do not respond to what we saw.”

Also speaking were representatives of Japan, Ethiopia, Bolivia and China.

The meeting began at 1:18 p.m. and ended at 1:55 p.m.

Statements

FODÉ SECK (Senegal) welcomed the resolution as “the first of its kind” on the Lake Chad Basin, saying it testified to the Council’s pledge to support countries combating the Boko Haram terrorist movement, and in so doing, resolve the humanitarian crisis.  It also arrived on the heels of the Council’s visit to Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Nigeria from 2 to 7 March.  Noting that the region had faced a security and humanitarian crisis since the advent of Boko Haram in 2009, he said the resolution invited continued action against that group through the Multinational Joint Task Force.  Noting that bilateral and multilateral efforts had helped the Task Force boost its logistical, mobility, communications, equipment and intelligence capacities, he called for contributions to its trust fund, requesting that the $400,000 pledged at the Oslo Conference be urgently disbursed.  The resolution encouraged Governments to enhance coordination, and for the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) and the Lake Chad Basin Commission to devise a joint strategy to tackle the causes behind Boko Haram’s existence.

AMR ABDELLATIF ABOULATTA (Egypt), expressing support for the text, said it underscored the importance of sovereignty, while staying within the Council’s mandate.  It also expressed the Council’s solidarity with countries in their efforts against Boko Haram, despite limited capacity, the complex military environment and the severity of the humanitarian crisis.  Negotiations had demonstrated the imperative of improving the Council’s working methods regarding consultations on draft resolutions, he said, emphasizing the need to uphold transparency and allow full participation by all members — whether permanent or non-permanent, and notably African members — when discussing issues relating to the continent.  The Council must maintain transparent communications on any draft resolution with all countries concerned, taking their concerns and proposals on board, he said, underlining, especially, the need to avoid unacceptable interference in the internal affairs of States and to keep abreast of realities on the ground.

KORO BESSHO (Japan) said the resolution’s unanimous adoption marked a milestone in the Council’s increased attention to the Lake Chad Basin.  Describing terrorism, trafficking, food insecurity and climate change as issues that could not be solved individually, he said the text emphasized that security gains must be paired with efforts to address development, human rights and the root causes of instability.  Japan urged building on today’s “foundational” resolution by using a variety of tools to achieve such aims through the United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel (UNOWAS), the United Nations Regional Office for Central Africa (UNOCA) and the Peacebuilding Commission, as well as subregional and regional organizations, and bilateral and multilateral support mechanisms.

TEKEDA ALEMU (Ethiopia) said the resolution conveyed the right message following negotiations.  Underscoring the impact of climate-change-induced challenges, as well as falling commodity prices on the Lake Chad Basin region, he said there had been little recognition of their severity on the international community’s part.  The resolution remained true to the Council’s commitment to the region’s countries, which had enthusiastically welcomed its recent mission and “expect nothing less”, he said.  Hopefully, the text would live up to those expectations, he added.

EVGENY ZAGAYNOV (Russian Federation) said his country had supported the resolution in light of the importance of maintaining Council unity on the issue.  However, not all its comments and arguments had been taken on board, he said, emphasizing that it was incorrect to describe the Lake Chad Basin situation as a “conflict”.  In fact, the Council had designated Boko Haram as a terrorist organization, he recalled, emphasizing that the situation on the ground was, therefore, of a counter-terrorism nature.  In addition, the resolution did not recognize the irresponsible policy of interference exercised by some States in the affairs of others — as had been done in Libya.  The delegation of the Russian Federation had urged its counterpart not to “rush” the resolution, but the latter had been determined to pass it under the United Kingdom Presidency and had not heeded those warnings, he said, adding that its actions had resulted in an “unrefined” text.

PEDRO LUIS INCHAUSTE JORDÁN (Bolivia) said the resolution aimed to demonstrate support for the Governments of Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Nigeria in their struggle against Boko Haram.  Calling on the Council to maintain its unanimity around that issue, and to respect the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of those countries, he echoed concerns voiced by other delegates over the Council’s working methods.  There had not been enough negotiating time on the resolution, he pointed out, saying he would have preferred to hold two further rounds of talks on its contents.

SHEN BO (China) emphasized the need to respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of countries in the region, and to help them upgrade their counter-terrorism abilities.  Support should also be provided to help the Multinational Joint Task Force improve the humanitarian situation.  The Council should pay due attention to any concerns expressed about the draft, reflecting them in the text, so as to achieve maximum consensus.

MATTHEW RYCROFT (United Kingdom), Council President for March, spoke in his national capacity, emphasizing that it was not enough merely to bring attention to the region.  “We will fail the people of the region if we do not respond to what we saw.”  The resolution made clear the need for the international community and the United Nations to scale up the response to the humanitarian crisis, notably by quickly disbursing funds pledged at the Oslo Conference, supporting the efforts of regional Governments to build an efficient crisis response, addressing economic inequalities and empowering women, especially since Boko Haram exploited men who viewed women as objects.  He called for improved bridging of humanitarian and development programmes, as well as greater support for the Task Force, expressing hope for the deployment of United Nations human rights advisers.

TOMMO MONTHE (Cameroon), speaking on behalf of the Lake Chad Basin Commission — comprising also Niger, Nigeria and Chad — said the Council’s unprecedented visit had allowed it to take stock of the nature of Boko Haram, a nebulous terrorist group that used girls as suicide bombers, burned down schools, raided cattle and ambushed both soldiers and civilians.  The Council had witnessed national military, humanitarian, diplomatic and other efforts to counter the group, he said, underlining:  “We are fighting against terrorism.”  Indeed, Boko Haram was associated with Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL/Da’esh), he pointed out.  Given the humanitarian, economic, political, social and military costs of the crisis, regional countries understood that the military response, though essential, should be part of a holistic approach, he said, stressing that each State must adopt and implement measures to tackle the causes and consequences of the current situation.

Welcoming the text’s mention of national development plans, he said the Commission had stepped up cooperation with ECCAS and ECOWAS.  While the Multilateral Joint Task Force had reduced Boko Haram’s military capacity, the group was not asleep, he cautioned.  It continued to carry out suicide bombings, abductions and ambushes.  Hopefully, today’s resolution would mark the start of more decisive support for the Task Force and regional initiatives, as well as to Lake Chad Basin countries forced to curtail spending on education, health and other services.  He welcomed paragraphs 33 and 34 of the text, on a joint visit by the Secretary-General, the Chairperson of the African Union Commission, the President of the World Bank Group and the President of the African Development Bank, expressing hope that the Secretary-General’s report would be bold and focused on the most appropriate solutions.

ANTHONY BOSAH (Nigeria), associating himself with the Lake Chad Basin Commission, said his country had expectations that, when military gains were made at the present critical juncture, the international community would continue to engage the Government of Nigeria in efforts to protect civilians and resolve the humanitarian situation.  He said he looked forward to a constructive approach from the Council, emphasizing that Nigeria was resolute in its efforts to defeat terrorism and had put a human-rights-based strategy in place to achieve that aim.

He went on to state that a Presidential Committee had been empowered to coordinate various efforts.  Nigeria continued to advance existing legal and institutional frameworks to attain humanitarian effectiveness.  It was providing food, health care and access to water for those in need, and engaging religious leaders as a way to discourage young people from becoming radicalized.  Stressing that the people of the Lake Chad Basin needed United Nations support, he said it was time to provide comprehensive assistance, including help with peacebuilding.  Noting that the shrinking of Lake Chad had exacerbated the hardship, with cross-border knock-on effects making it more difficult for Governments to meet people’s needs, he called for spirited efforts to alleviate human suffering, reiterating that the region’s future lay in the security and stability of the resources around Lake Chad.

Resolution

The full text of resolution 2349 (2017) reads as follows:

The Security Council,

Recalling its previous resolutions and presidential statements on counter-terrorism, conflict prevention in Africa, the protection of civilians, women, peace and security, children and armed conflict, and on the United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel (UNOWAS) and the United Nations Regional Office for Central Africa (UNOCA),

Recalling its visit to the Lake Chad Basin region (the region) from 2 to 7 March 2017 to engage in dialogue with the Governments of Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria, displaced persons, security and humanitarian personnel, civil society including women’s organizations, and regional bodies,

Affirming its solidarity and full support for the conflict-affected populations of the region including displaced and host communities who are suffering from the ongoing security crisis, humanitarian emergency and development deficits resulting from the violence by terrorist groups Boko Haram and the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL, also known as Da’esh), and its solidarity with the respective Governments in their efforts to address these urgent needs, whilst addressing adverse economic conditions,

Affirming its strong commitment to the sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity of Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Nigeria,

Recognizing the determination and ownership of the Governments in the region, as well as subregional and regional organizations, to address the impact of Boko Haram and ISIL,

Expressing grave concern at the ongoing terrorist attacks perpetrated by Boko Haram and ISIL, and the dire humanitarian situation across the region caused by the activities of Boko Haram, including large-scale displacement, and the risk of famine in north-east Nigeria,

Reaffirming that terrorism in all forms and manifestations constitutes one of the most serious threats to international peace and security and that any acts of terrorism are criminal and unjustifiable regardless of their motivations, whenever and by whomever committed, and remaining determined to contribute further to enhancing the effectiveness of the overall effort to fight this scourge on a global level,

Expressing deep concern that terrorist groups benefiting from transnational organized crime and trafficking in all forms may contribute to undermining affected States, specifically their security, stability, governance, social and economic development, and recognizing the connection between trafficking in persons, sexual violence and terrorism and other transnational organized criminal activities, which can prolong and exacerbate conflict and instability or intensify its impact on civilian populations,

Recognizing that security, development and human rights are interlinked and mutually reinforcing and are vital to an effective and comprehensive approach to countering terrorism, stabilization and reconciliation,

Welcoming the commitment expressed by the Governments in the region to combat Boko Haram, in order to create a safe and secure environment for civilians, enable the return of internally displaced persons and refugees, facilitate stabilization, and enable access for humanitarian organizations, in accordance with the African Union Peace and Security Council’s mandate, commending the important territorial advances by the Governments in the region against Boko Haram, including through the Multinational Joint Task Force which has contributed to the liberation of hostages, the arrest of Boko Haram members, and an increase in the number of defectors, and further paying tribute to all those who have lost lives in the fight against Boko Haram,

Recognizing the threat posed by terrorist groups Boko Haram and ISIL, and recalling that Boko Haram has been designated as associated with Al-Qaida by the 1267/1989/2253 ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee (the Committee),

Underscoring the need for a holistic, comprehensive approach to degrade and defeat Boko Haram and ISIL that includes coordinated security operations, conducted in accordance with applicable international law, as well as enhanced civilian efforts to improve governance, promote development and economic growth in affected areas, tackle radicalization, and ensure women’s empowerment and protection,

Recognizing the interconnectedness of the challenges facing the Lake Chad Basin and the wider Sahel region and encouraging greater regional and international coherence in addressing these challenges,

Security, Protection of Civilians and Human Rights

“1.   Strongly condemns all terrorist attacks, violations of international humanitarian law and abuses of human rights by Boko Haram and ISIL in the region, including those involving killings and other violence against civilians, notably women and children, abductions, pillaging, child, early and forced marriage, rape, sexual slavery and other sexual and gender-based violence, and recruitment and use of children, including increasingly the use of girls as suicide bombers, and destruction of civilian property, and calls for those responsible for these acts to be held accountable, and brought to justice;

“2.   Recalls the Communiqués of the African Union Peace and Security Council on Boko Haram, including from the 484th meeting, recognizes the continued support of the African Union to the Multinational Joint Task Force, and calls for the Member States of the Lake Chad Basin Commission and Benin to continue their efforts in the fight against Boko Haram and implementation of the communiqués; further acknowledging the need for an effective and strategic relationship between the African Union Peace and Security Council and the Security Council, to enable both institutions to support stability and development in the Lake Chad Basin;

“3.   Encourages Governments in the region to sustain momentum, further enhance regional military cooperation and coordination, comply with obligations under international humanitarian and human rights law, secure the conditions to enable safe, timely and unhindered humanitarian access, facilitate the restoration of civilian security and the rule of law in areas restored to Government control, and guarantee free movement of goods and persons; and further encourages regional collaboration on the implementation of the 2016 Abuja Regional Security Summit conclusions and strengthened cooperation under the auspices of a third Regional Security Summit in 2018, including with respect to post-conflict stabilization and recovery;

“4.   Welcomes the multilateral and bilateral support provided to the military efforts in the region and encourages greater support to strengthen the operational capability of the Multinational Joint Task Force to further the region’s efforts to combat Boko Haram and ISIL, which may include appropriate, logistical, mobility and communications assistance, equipment, as well as modalities to increase effective information sharing as appropriate, given the complex environment in which they operate and the evolving tactics of Boko Haram and ISIL, as well as training, including on sexual and gender-based violence, gender and child protection;

“5.   Calls for the urgent deployment of the remaining Multinational Joint Task Force civilian personnel, including Human Rights Advisers through the African Union, and a dedicated Gender Adviser, and for the pledges made at the African Union donor conference of 1 February 2015 in support of the Multinational Joint Task Force to be promptly fulfilled, encourages the African Union to disperse funds provided for the Multinational Joint Task Force by key partners, further encourages Member States to contribute generously to the African Union Trust Fund, and requests the Secretary-General to advocate strongly with the international community and donors in support of this effort;

“6.   Reiterates its call on Member States to move vigorously and decisively to cut the flows of funds and other financial assets and economic resources to individuals, groups, undertakings and entities on the ISIL and Al-Qaida Sanctions List, including Boko Haram, reiterates its readiness to consider listing individuals, groups, undertakings and entities providing support to Boko Haram, including those who are financing, arming, planning or recruiting for Boko Haram, and in this regard encourages all Member States to submit to the Committee listing requests for individuals, groups, undertakings and entities supporting Boko Haram;

“7.   Calls upon the countries of the region to prevent, criminalize, investigate, prosecute and ensure accountability of those who engage in transnational organized crime, in particular in arms trafficking and trafficking in persons;

“8.   Calls upon relevant United Nations entities, including UNOCA, UNOWAS, and the United Nations Office to the African Union to redouble their support for Governments in the region, as well as subregional and regional organizations, to address the impact of Boko Haram and ISIL violence on the peace and stability of the region, including by addressing the conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism, and violent extremism that can be conducive to terrorism, in line with the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, and to conduct and gather gender-sensitive research and data collection on the drivers of radicalization for women, and the impacts of counter-terrorism strategies on women’s human rights and women’s organizations, in order to develop targeted and evidence-based policy and programming responses;

“9.   Calls upon Member States to ensure that any measures taken to counter terrorism comply with all their obligations under international law, in particular, international human rights law, international refugee law and international humanitarian law; and further encourages Governments in the region to consider, in discussion with communities, the potential impact of operations against and security responses to Boko Haram and ISIL on people’s livelihoods, and freedom of movement;

“10.  Expresses regret at the tragic loss of life in the January 2017 Rann incident, welcomes the commitment expressed by relevant Nigerian authorities to investigate and ensure accountability for those responsible, and calls for transparency on the findings of the investigation report and action taken;

“11.  Expresses concern about the protection needs of civilians in the region affected by the scourge of terrorism, including those resulting from sexual exploitation and abuse, extra-judicial killings, arbitrary detention, torture, and recruitment and use of children in violation of international law; and welcomes initial steps taken such as the deployment of female members of the security services to internally displace persons camps where sexual exploitation and abuse has been reported or confirmed;

“12.  Reiterates the primary responsibility of Member States to protect civilian populations on their territories, in accordance with their obligations under international law, and calls on all Governments in the region, and as relevant the United Nations and other actors, to prioritize human rights protection concerns including through:  greater cooperation by concerned Governments with the Office of United Nations the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) and the Offices of the Special Representatives on Sexual Violence in Conflict and Children and Armed Conflict; taking urgent measures to prevent arbitrary arrest and detention and ensure that persons deprived of liberty are treated in accordance with international law; enhanced capacity and responsiveness of national human rights mechanisms across the region; and taking measures to increase the number of women in the security sector;

“13.  Emphasizes the importance of strengthening cross-border judicial cooperation in identifying and prosecuting perpetrators of human rights violations and abuses, as well as the most serious crimes, such as sexual and gender-based violence; calls on Governments in the region to provide rapid access for survivors of abduction and sexual violence to specialized medical and psychosocial services, and community reintegration, to prevent stigmatization and persecution, and encourages the international community to extend its support in this regard; urges the prompt investigation of all allegations of abuse, including sexual abuse, and holding those responsible accountable; and encourages the creation of a timeline for transferral of camp management to civilian structures to ensure the civilian nature of internally displaced persons sites, whilst taking due consideration of the security situation in these sites;

“14.  Urges Governments in the region to ensure women’s full and equal participation in national institutions and mechanisms for the prevention and resolution of conflicts, including in the development of strategies to counter Boko Haram and ISIL, welcomes initial efforts in the region to address women’s representation such as the 25-per-cent quota for elected offices in Niger, and strongly encourages the further development, implementation and funding of National Action Plans on Women, Peace and Security by Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Nigeria; and encourages all regional organizations engaged in peace and security efforts in the region to ensure that gender analysis and women’s participation are integrated into their assessments, planning and operations;

Humanitarian

“15.  Welcomes the efforts of Governments in the region and of regional and subregional organizations, as well as the hospitality provided by host communities for the millions of displaced people, the majority of whom are women and children, who are uniquely impacted, and urges Governments in the region, donors and relevant international non-governmental organizations to urgently redouble their efforts and ensure close coordination, including between development and humanitarian actors, in particular to enhance early recovery, food security, improve living conditions, and increase livelihood opportunities;

“16.  Urges all parties to the conflict to ensure respect for and protection of humanitarian personnel, facilities, and their means of transport and equipment, and to facilitate safe, timely and unhindered access for humanitarian organizations to deliver lifesaving aid to affected people, and in particular in the case of Governments, where applicable, through facilitating bureaucratic and administrative procedures such as the expediting of outstanding registrations, and importation of humanitarian supplies, and further calls upon Governments in the region to increase collaboration with United Nations partners including through more effective civilian-military coordination mechanisms;

“17.  Welcomes the $458 million in humanitarian assistance pledged at the Oslo conference for 2017 and urges swift disbursement of these funds to prevent further deterioration of the humanitarian crisis and to begin to address endemic development needs; and strongly encourages all other/non-traditional donors to contribute in line with the needs highlighted in the 2017 Humanitarian Response Plans of each country;

“18.  Further welcomes the Government of Nigeria’s announcement of its 2017 spending plans for north-east Nigeria which project total federal and state government expenditure of $1 billion on development and humanitarian activities, and urges swift implementation of these plans;

“19.  Welcomes the scaling up of the United Nations response, especially in north-east Nigeria, and calls for further deployment of experienced staff, measures to reduce staff turnover, and strong coordination, including through creation of civil-military coordination guidelines, provision of training to further improve coordination between armed forces and humanitarian personnel, coordination across borders and the development of multi-year prioritized plans; and further calls on all humanitarian organizations to ensure programming is gender-sensitive, based on strengthening resilience within communities and developed based on the need of, and where possible in consultation with affected people and local organizations;

“20.  Urges relevant national and through them local authorities to ensure that resources dedicated to the humanitarian effort are directed to those most in need;

“21.  Calls upon Governments in the region to ensure that the return of refugees and internally displaced persons to their areas of origin is voluntary, based on informed decisions, and in safety and dignity; urges relevant national and local authorities to work cooperatively with displaced persons and host communities, to prevent secondary displacement of affected populations, and to take all necessary steps to respond to the humanitarian needs of host communities, and encourages the international community to extend its support in this regard; welcomes the signing by the Governments of Nigeria and Cameroon, and the Office of United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), of the tripartite agreement on 2 March 2017 on the voluntary repatriation of Nigerian refugees, and urges its swift and complete implementation;

Root Causes and Development

“22.  Calls upon the Governments in the region to take further measures to address social, political, economic and gender inequalities, and environmental challenges, and to develop strategies to counter the violent extremist narrative that can incite terrorist acts, and address the conditions conducive to the spread of violent extremism, which can be conducive to terrorism, including by empowering youth, families, women, religious, cultural and education leaders, in order to help address the conditions which have enabled the emergence and survival of Boko Haram and ISIL;

“23.  Recognizes the complex challenges faced by the region and welcomes the development of programmes by the respective Governments to help build and sustain peace by addressing the root causes of the crisis, namely the ‘Buhari Plan’ of Nigeria, the Programme ‘Renaissance’ of Niger, the ‘Recovery Road Map’ the Special Youth Triennial Programme of Cameroon, the ‘Vision 2030: the Chad we want’ of Chad, and the Lake Chad Development and Climate Resilience Action Plan of the Lake Chad Basin Commission; calls upon respective Governments to strengthen their coordination and prioritization within these programmes to enable effective implementation, and calls upon international partners to extend their support in this regard;

“24.  Calls upon Governments in the region, including through the support of the international community, to support early recovery activities and long-term investment in vital services such as health care and education, agriculture, infrastructure such as the safe trade corridor and livelihoods, social cohesion, good governance, and the rule of law, to enhance longer-term recovery and resilience of populations, particularly for the areas with the most pressing need;

“25.  Encourages the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), together with the Lake Chad Basin Commission, to develop a comprehensive and common strategy that effectively addresses the drivers that contributed to the emergence of Boko Haram and ISIL, with a particular focus on longer term development needs; and further urges the two subregional organizations to convene their planned summit on Boko Haram to adopt a common strategy and develop active cooperation and coordination mechanisms;

“26.  Recognizes the adverse effects of climate change and ecological changes among other factors on the stability of the region, including through water scarcity, drought, desertification, land degradation, and food insecurity, and emphasizes the need for adequate risk assessments and risk management strategies by governments and the United Nations relating to these factors;

“27.  Acknowledges the important contribution of civil society, in particular women’s and youth organizations, to conflict prevention, conflict resolution, and peacebuilding and humanitarian efforts in the region, and encourages greater dialogue between respective Governments and civil society, as well as support;

“28.  Calls upon the United Nations and its partners to make further progress towards the implementation of the United Nations Integrated Strategy for the Sahel (UNISS) in order to address comprehensively the security, political and developmental challenges and the underlying root causes and drivers of instability and conflicts in the Sahel region;

Disarmament, Demobilization, Rehabilitation and Reintegration, and Accountability

“29.  Encourages Governments in the region, in collaboration with regional and subregional organizations, relevant United Nations entities and other relevant stakeholders, and in the context of this resolution, to develop and implement a regional and coordinated strategy that encompasses transparent, inclusive, human rights-compliant disarmament, demobilization, de-radicalization, rehabilitation and reintegration initiatives, in line with strategies for prosecution, where appropriate, for persons associated with Boko Haram and ISIL, drawing upon regional and international best practice and lessons learned; and urges relevant national and through them local actors, to develop and implement appropriate plans for the disarmament, demobilization, reintegration, and where appropriate prosecution of the Civilian Joint Task Force and other community-based security groups;

“30.  Stresses the need to pay particular attention to the treatment and reintegration of women and children formerly associated with Boko Haram and ISIL, including through the signing and implementing of protocols for the rapid handover of children suspected of having association with Boko Haram to relevant civilian child protection actors, as well as access for child protection actors to all centres holding children, in accordance with applicable international obligations, and the best interests of the child;

“31.  Urges Governments in the region to develop and implement consistent policies for promoting defections from Boko Haram and ISIL and for deradicalizing and reintegrating those who do defect, and to ensure that there is no impunity for those responsible for terrorist acts, and abuses and violations of international human rights and violations of humanitarian law; and invites the international community to extend its support to the Governments in the region in developing and implementing their disarmament, demobilization, rehabilitation and reintegration strategies and policies;

“32.  Calls upon concerned governments to urgently develop and implement, consistent with international law, in particular international human rights law, international refugee law and international humanitarian law as applicable, vetting criteria and processes allowing for the prompt assessment of all persons who have been associated with Boko Haram and ISIL in the custody of authorities, including persons captured or surrendered to authorities, or who are found in refugee or internally displaced persons camps, and to ensure that children are treated in accordance with international law; and encourages Governments in the region, within the context of this resolution, to prosecute those responsible for terrorist acts, where appropriate, and to develop both rehabilitation programmes in custodial settings for detained terrorist suspects and sentenced persons, and reintegration programmes to assist persons either released from custody having served their sentence or those who have completed a rehabilitation programme in an alternative setting, in order to facilitate reintegration into their communities;

Follow-up

“33.  Encourages the Secretary-General, with a view to enhancing collaboration and responsibility among relevant entities and mobilizing resources for the region, to make a high level visit to the region, and invites him to consider undertaking a joint visit with the World Bank, Chairperson of the African Union Commission, the President of the World Bank Group, and the President of the African Development Bank, to strengthen the focus on and commitment to the region of the international community;

“34.  Requests the Secretary-General to produce a written report within five months on the United Nations’ assessment of the situation in the Lake Chad Basin Region as it relates to elements of this resolution, particularly regarding the progress made and remaining challenges, and possible measures for consideration, including with respect to achieving greater coherence of efforts in the context of overlapping regional strategies, and thereafter to include these elements in regular reporting by UNOCA and UNOWAS.”

Read More

La Fondation Jeffrey Modell va déployer le premier réseau nord-africain pour le traitement de l’immunodéficience primaire

CSL Behring sponsorise le premier réseau de ce genre sur le continent africain LIVINGSTONE, Zambie, 31 mars 2017 /PRNewswire/ — Le leader mondial des produits biothérapeutiques CSL Behring a confirmé aujourd’hui son intention de sponsoriser le réseau nord-africain Jeffrey Modell, qui établira un centre de diagnostic et de recherche en Afrique du Nord. CSL Behring […]

Read More

Jeffrey Modell Foundation to Open the First North African Network for Primary Immunodeficiencies

CSL Behring Sponsors the First Network of its Kind on the African Continent LIVINGSTONE, Zambia, March 31, 2017 /PRNewswire/ — Global biotherapeutics leader CSL Behring today announced its commitment to sponsor the Jeffrey Modell North African Network, which will establish a diagnostic and research center in Northern Africa, making it the first enterprise dedicated to helping primary […]

Read More

PHIRI NAMED MALAWI COACH

The Football Association of Malawi (FAM) has named former U-20 trainer Gerald Phiri as head coach of the senior national team.The appointment of Phiri comes barely three weeks before the Flames travel to Antananarivo to face Madagascar in the qualifier…

Read More

PHIRI NAMED MALAWI COACH

The Football Association of Malawi (FAM) has named former U-20 trainer Gerald Phiri as head coach of the senior national team.The appointment of Phiri comes barely three weeks before the Flames travel to Antananarivo to face Madagascar in the qualifier…

Read More

BUREAU OF THE COUNCIL RECOMMENDS SLOT ALLOCATION FOR THE 2026 FIFA WORLD CUP

The Bureau of the FIFA Council – comprised of the FIFA President and the presidents of each of the six confederations – convened this Thursday at the Home of FIFA in Zurich and agreed on a proposed slot allocation for the FIFA World Cup� as of the 2026 edition.

The recommendation will now be submitted for the ratification of the FIFA Council, whose next meeting is scheduled for 9 May in Manama, Bahrain, two days prior to the 67th FIFA Congress.

After 10 January, when the FIFA Council unanimously decided on expanding the FIFA World Cup to a 48-team competition, FIFA, the confederations and the member associations engaged in a consultation process, which resulted in the proposal recommended by the Bureau of the Council. According to this proposal, the split of direct berths is as follows:

Slot allocation*

� AFC: 8 direct slots

� CAF: 9 direct slots

� CONCACAF: 6 direct slots

� CONMEBOL: 6 direct slots

� OFC: 1 direct slot

� UEFA: 16 direct slots

* The host country would also automatically qualify for the FIFA World Cup, and its slot would be taken from the quota of its confederation. In the event of co-hosting, the number of host countries to qualify automatically would be decided by the FIFA Council.

Play-off tournament for two remaining slots

The above allocation accounts for 46 of the 48 participating teams. The proposal reviewed by the Bureau of the Council includes a play-off tournament involving six teams to decide the last two FIFA World Cup berths:

– One team per confederation with the exception of UEFA + one additional team from the confederation of the host country;

– Two teams to be seeded based on the FIFA/Coca-Cola World Ranking. The seeded teams will play for a FIFA World Cup berth against the winners of the first two knockout games involving the four unseeded teams;

– Tournament to be played in the host country(ies) and to be used as a test event for the FIFA World Cup;

– Existing play-off window of November 2025 suggested as tentative date for the 2026 edition.

Source: Confederation Africaine de Football

Read More

We are not the world: Inside the “perfect storm” of famine

Like the four countries facing extreme hunger crises today, the famine that gripped Ethiopia from 1983 to 1985 struggled for attention until it was far too late.

There was conflict. There had been years of consecutive drought – similar to Somalia now. The government spent its money on fighting, not aid. The rich world eventually reacted, with Bob Geldof and Live Aid at the forefront of a public funding campaign. But access in a time of war was hard. By 1984, 200,000 mostly starving Ethiopians had died, young children often the first to go. The final toll was closer to one million.

More than three decades later, the stakes are arguably even higher. A badly strained humanitarian system finds itself facing not one but four vast challenges. In all, more than 20 million people are at risk of starvation and famine across South Sudan, Somalia, Yemen, and northeastern Nigeria.

Much has been learnt since 1984: the value of building resilience before crises arrive, the role climate change plays, the imperative of early conflict prevention, the importance of cash aid, the need to prioritise water as well as food. Nonetheless, the goal posts for those struggling to reach the world’s most vulnerable and provide them with life-saving assistance have shifted. Why?

The simple answer is conflict. It’s the one factor that afflicts all four famine-facing regions listed above. And that’s not to mention how the effects of war in places like Iraq and Syria, including the mass migration to Europe, have drained valuable humanitarian resources and donor dollars.

As Nancy Lindborg, president of the US Institute of Peace, pointed out in testimony last week before the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee, “humanitarian assistance flows have shifted from 80 percent of global aid going to victims of natural disasters to now 80 percent going to assist victims of violent conflict.”

Unfortunately, Lindborg’s remarks may well have fallen on deaf ears: President Donald Trump’s administration is threatening draconian cuts to the State Department’s budget, affecting US funding for everything from UN peacekeeping to the United Nations Development Programme and UNICEF.

 

And garnering the attention required to generate the $4.4 billion the UN says is required by July to stave off a humanitarian “catastrophe” is only part of the battle. Devising the correct response strategy and securing the necessary access in complex and fragmented war zones is likely to be even harder.

These four famines or near-famines do have similarities, but they also have different origins, different trajectories, and therefore different needs. Local factors are at play, with each country prone to its own combination of flaring conflict, weak governance, poor infrastructure, and failing markets.

 

Video: Inside the perfect storm of famine

Inside the “perfect storm” of famine leer_jason_cattle.jpg Special Report Aid and Policy Conflict Food Health Politics and Economics IRIN Africa Somalia South Sudan Cameroon Chad Niger Nigeria Middle East and North Africa Yemen Yemen

Famine hasn’t officially been declared (yet) in Yemen, but, with more hungry people than any of the other big three areas at risk, this feels rather like a technicality.

A reminder of the UN definition: At least 20 percent of households in an area with extreme food shortages and a limited ability to cope; acute malnutrition rates exceed 30 percent; and a death rate exceeding two persons per day per 10,000 persons due to lack of food. As Somalia found out in 2011-2012, famine doesn’t need to have been declared for many to die. Nearly half its starvation deaths occurred before it met this statistical definition, including almost 30,000 children in just three months.

Right now, 17 million of Yemen’s overall population of 27.4 million are classified as food insecure and 3.3 million people, including 2.1 million children, have acute malnutrition. Some half a million children are even worse off – with severe acute malnutrition – UNICEF counts this as a 200 percent increase since 2014.

Yemen’s crisis is entirely man-made (UN relief chief Stephen O’Brien said as much in recent comments). As such, to the few paying attention, it’s been like watching a car crash in slow motion.

 

 

Even before fighting began two years ago, Yemen was a poor country with a chronic hunger problem. But it was, for the most part, manageable: Aid agencies could move about the country with relative ease; most families could buy their meals at market. That was before the Houthi rebels reportedly helped themselves to the reserves in Yemen’s Central Bank, the country’s sole remaining neutral institution. Their rivals, the government and allies of ousted but internationally recognised President Abd Rabbu Mansour Hadi, moved the bank to their southern stronghold of Aden in September, and since then salaries of public sector workers on all sides of the conflict have gone unpaid.

The economy is now in complete freefall, with 80 percent of families in debt. “Middle-class people who used to be able to feed their families no longer have the cash to get food, even when it is available on the open market,” World Food Programme spokeswoman Abeer Etefa explained.

Getting food into Yemen is harder than ever, and becoming pricier too. This matters a great deal in a country that even before this war depended on imports for 90 percent of its food.

Commercial flights aren’t an option – the Saudi Arabia-led coalition has banned them for months. Hodeida port, once the main entry point for cargo ships bringing fuel, food, and medicine, was hit in August 2015. The airstrikes knocked out four of its five functioning cranes.

These days, ships are delayed for weeks at port – if they make it through a UN inspection and a slightly less formal one by the Saudi coalition. Mark Kaye, conflict and humanitarian advocacy advisor for Save the Children, told IRIN the majority of supplies are now unloaded by hand, and that his organisation is finding the private vessels it pays to bring in vital medicines increasingly hesitant to take on the risk.

This is compounded by an uptick of fighting off the coast – the latest example being more than 40 Somalis killed when their boat was struck recently, allegedly by an Apache helicopter.

WFP also struggles with delays (although it has its own ships), and in February it purchased four mobile cranes – to the tune of $3.8 million – meant as a stopgap to “boost the port’s capacity in handling humanitarian cargo”.

A spokesperson told IRIN the vessel carrying the cranes “had been waiting for approval for nearly two weeks to berth [at Hodeida]… but was denied the required security clearances to offload the cranes.” WFP didn’t respond when asked who exactly denied the clearance.

Food insecurity predictions for March-July 2017 – FAO/IPC

So the holdups continue, and they have real consequences. When Save the Children’s medications were delayed at port, Kaye said mobile medical teams “were running at the bare minimum”.

“That means you have to make really tough choices,” he added. “If you are treating the child who comes in and is critical, you can’t treat the child who isn’t critical today but will be next week.”

Once aid makes it into Yemen, it’s a dangerous obstacle course to get it to the most needy, as much of the worst malnutrition is in the areas most heavily impacted by fighting. And some places are under siege, like Taiz city and governorate, making distribution even harder.

“Every party to this conflict makes it extremely difficult for aid agencies and aid workers to get to some parts of the country,” said WFP’s Etefa. She described Yemen, with seven million in need of emergency food assistance to survive, as a “perfect storm… conflict, collapsing economy, limited capacity at ports, [Saudi and internal] blockades, more poverty, and a country that has had chronic hunger problems.”

The unthinkable may be about to get worse. There’s fear ground fighting is headed for Hodeida, potentially giving the Saudi-led coalition a road to the Houthis in Sana’a and shuttering the port completely. This is what keeps humanitarians up at night, and what might just throw Yemen into full-fledged famine.

South Sudan

The South Sudanese government has already declared famine in two counties, and the UN says 5.5 million people will be on the verge of starvation by July if they don’t get food.

There’s a dramatic shortfall of funds to stave off the looming catastrophe, with only 18.5 percent of the appeal funding received so far. But that isn’t South Sudan’s biggest problem. Even if humanitarian agencies get the entire $1.6 billion they’ve asked for this year, they’ll struggle to deliver aid to those most in need.

The country is a bewildering patchwork of armed groups, including various rebel factions as well as the army and government-aligned militias. All sides have engaged in ethnically motivated mass killings, and sexual violence has reached “horrifying” levels, according to the UN.

Aid agencies are forced to take extraordinary measures to try to find people in need and ensure their staff members don’t become casualties too, skirting around armed groups to get aid to people in remote areas.

“We have small planes that land on bush runways. We hire porters to walk for hours and hours and hours to get to these islands where people are hiding, where teams are working,” explained Nicolas Peissel, a project coordinator for Médecins Sans Frontières who has recently been to Leer and Mayendit, the counties, both in rebel-held areas, where famine has been declared.

“We take canoes,” he told IRIN. “There’s one place it takes us over 18 hours to get medicine to them by canoe; so we use whatever is available to us.”

But no amount of precautions can ensure safety for aid workers in South Sudan’s complicated conflict. They have been beaten, kidnapped, and killed.

In one recent attack, unknown men ambushed a team with the International Organization for Migration that was travelling by convoy on its way back from an area where cholera had broken out. Two people died from gunshot wounds and three others were injured.

Then, on 25 March, six more aid workers were killed in an ambush. At least 79 aid workers have been murdered since South Sudan descended into civil war in December 2013.

Such incidents underscore that it’s the war that has caused famine in two counties, and it’s the war that will make it worse.

“Those other areas at risk of famine could have a chance of averting catastrophe if humanitarian access is secured and respected,” the UN’s emergency aid coordination body, OCHA, said in a recent report.

But judging by the actions of both the government and opposition so far, there’s little chance that will suddenly begin to happen.

Speaking to the Security Council on 23 March, UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres noted that the peace process is at a standstill, while government forces have been looting humanitarian compounds and blocking access to people in need. The government has refused to heed warnings from the international community that it must cease such actions to save its people from starvation. “On the contrary, what we hear most often are denials – a refusal by the leadership to even acknowledge the crisis or to fulfil its responsibility to end it,” said Guterres.

On cue, South Sudan’s representative told the Security Council that his government has cooperated with the UN and its forces have not targeted civilians or perpetrated sexual violence – claims so obviously false they would be laughable if the situation was not so tragic.

So, the government continues down its path of denial as humanitarians wring their hands, and the world’s newest nation staggers inexorably toward a devastating famine.

Northeast Nigeria Families gather for another distribution of cash handouts.

Things are very different in Nigeria. Eight years into the Boko Haram crisis, the momentum of the humanitarian response is finally beginning to build.

But the extent of the problem is huge. Some 5.1 million people are food insecure out of a population of 5.8 million in the three affected northeastern states. But only a fraction – 1.9 million – are being reached.

This is a crisis of both funding and access. Some $1.1 billion is needed this year for humanitarian action, but the response plan has so far received only $160 million. And despite the government’s repeated promise that the insurgency has been broken, the security situation is fluid, limiting the reach of aid workers. That means the humanitarian presence is at its weakest in the areas where it is most urgently needed.

The emergency has been slow to reveal its true scale. Boko Haram was in control of much of the northeast by 2014, effectively locking up the rural population. Those that could escape did, mostly heading to Maiduguri, the capital of Borno State. But little was known of the needs of the many more left behind.

It’s now clear they are substantial. The military’s advance is breaking Boko Haram’s hold, and, as it does, people are emerging, looking for help. “They are hungry and malnourished; some are incoherent; they have clearly been through a lot,” said Malik Samuel, field communications manager for Médecins Sans Frontières.

As the military liberates the last remaining areas of the northeast, along the northern border with Niger, it’s possible that pockets of starving people in localised famines will be found. The aid response is already stretched. Will it be able to cope? Can it be sustained?

The hope is that it will be more effective than last year, when the USAID-funded early warning system, FEWS NET, said that famine had “likely occurred” in Bama and Banki – two towns the military recaptured in 2015.

The army was unable to care for the people arriving from the surrounding countryside. Although Bama is only 74 kilometres from Maiduguri, as many as 2,000 “famine-related deaths” may have occurred. The situation was likely worse outside the town. We don’t know, because the area was deemed too high-risk to venture into by most aid agencies.

Bama is now flooded with aid workers. “The government and NGOs stepped up,” said Samuel. “Across the northeast, the aid response is better.”

It’s certainly more coordinated than it was. There are more skilled staff available, and the at-times tetchy relationship with government authorities has become smoother. But there are still serious gaps. The army nominally controls 23 out of the 27 Local Government Areas in Borno. But its hold is typically restricted to the main town in the area, where the aid operation is based, feeding the displaced who make it out of still-inaccessible rural zones.

“In some [LGAs], there is still not enough food [distributed],” said Adrian Ouvry, regional humanitarian advisor for Mercy Corps. “In some areas, there is not enough fuel wood, so even if you have the food you can’t cook it.”

Food security is also about functioning markets: Farmers need to be able to sell their produce. But those trade links between the towns and the countryside have been severed by the conflict. Boko Haram turned to requisitioning the food it needed, and as a result farmers planted less and less.

The government’s counter-insurgency approach also deepened the isolation of the rural population. Fearful of Boko Haram’s mobility and the threat of infiltration, it banned fuel sales and restricted movement. The closure of the borders – where it could be enforced – also hit agricultural trade, especially the once-thriving livestock business that historically stretched as far as Central African Republic.

Nigeria is in recession as a result of slumping oil prices and the naira’s freefalling exchange rate against the dollar. Year-on-year inflation hit 19 percent in January, pushing up prices of local and imported staples. This is also being felt keenly in neighbouring Sahelian countries that are struggling already and depend on smuggled Nigerian produce.

Some 1.8 million people are displaced in the three northeastern states of Adamawa, Borno, and Yobe. The bulk are in Maiduguri, whose population has doubled to two million. Rather than settling in poorly serviced official camps, more than 80 percent of these victims of the war live with friends and relatives in the community, further straining households.

Food insecurity projections for June-August 2017 – FAO/IPC

Nigeria’s northeast had always been food secure and self-sufficient. But for a third consecutive year farmers have been unable to return to the land for the planting season. The Borno State government, possibly as a sign of frustration, has called for IDPs to head back to their homes by 29 May.

This is widely seen as an impossible goal given the insecurity, the lack of government services, and the deliberate destruction of infrastructure by Boko Haram, which, according to the World Bank, includes 30 percent of homes in Borno.

The best that could be achieved would be the return of people to the largest towns in the LGAs, but this only relocates the problem of caring for those in need to strained urban centres.

The Nigerian government has given assurances that nobody will be forced to move against their will. That is not the case with neighbouring Cameroon, which is “deporting Nigerians on a daily basis”, said MSF’s Samuel. This is despite a tripartite agreement, also signed by the UN’s refugee agency (UNHCR), that forbids refoulement. Nigerians are being forced onto trucks and dumped on the border, where they have a long wait – sometimes weeks – before they receive any assistance.

It’s a reminder that this is a regional emergency. Boko Haram attacks have spilled over into Chad, Niger, and Cameroon, all of which are sheltering Nigerian refugees and their own displaced as a result of the violence. And this is a fragile Sahelian zone, also grappling with the growing impact of climate change and endemic poverty.

Somalia

 “Here we go again” might be a typical reaction to the slow-motion disaster that has left 5.5 million people in urgent need of food aid in Somalia.

Drought? Check. Conflict? Check. Rampant poverty and underdevelopment? Check. An international appeal for almost a billion dollars? Check again. So is this a repeat of 2011, when a famine claimed around 250,000 lives? There are several parallels, but also some significant differences, both in the context on the ground and in the humanitarian response.

The drought itself is worse and has lasted much longer than the one that preceded the 2011 famine. Of the four countries highlighted, only in Somalia is there a drought. Almost the whole country has suffered near-total crop failure, leading to sharp price rises; some grains cost double what they did a year ago. Livestock herds – the equivalent of bank accounts for many – are dying in vast numbers, with widespread sickness driving down the value of surviving animals. The cost of labour, meanwhile, has plummeted. All this means households have considerably less money to buy food that is a lot more expensive. 

Large swathes of the country where the food crisis is at its worst, such as in the Bay, Bakool, and Juba regions, where al-Shabab is the de facto authority, are no-go areas for almost all aid agencies, who are denied permission to work there or simply not allowed through checkpoints. The security risks to aid workers in Somalia are also very real: last year there were 165 violent incidents and 16 aid workers killed.

But inaccessibility and al-Shabab’s presence are not the only factors at play. The adjoining regions of Sool and Sanaag are in the second most severe category of food insecurity but they lie well north of the Islamist group’s main theatre of operations, between the self-declared independent state of Somaliland and Puntland, a semi-autonomous region. Drought there has been especially fierce, while there has been very little investment in resilience projects and humanitarian presence is minimal (unlike in Somalia as a whole, where more than 300 different relief agencies operate).

Across Somalia, access is generally better than it was in 2011, with an atomised humanitarian presence in aid hubs from which surrounding villages can be reached. This is one reason why today’s map of food insecurity, despite the more severe drought, is less alarming than that of four years ago.  

The response to that disaster was widely derided as too little much too late and led to considerable soul-searching and the drawing up of “lessons learned”. Chief among these was a determination to ensure that, come the next crisis, aid would be delivered from points much closer to people in need. Mobile health clinics, which play a key role in addressing acute malnutrition and drought-related diseases such as cholera, will, funding permitting, reach further and wider than previously.

The UN’s Operational Plan for Pre-Famine Scale-Up of Humanitarian Assistance calls for some 4.6 million Somalis to be given access to health services. And the scaling-up of cash-based programming – which accounts for half the planned food response, with the food itself provided by the private sector – is another example of more proximate delivery. In many cases, this assistance arrives directly to people’s phones via mobile money services.

Additional components of the plan include targeting 200,000 severely malnourished children with therapeutic interventions (such as peanut pastes) and a further two million children for treatment and prevention of moderate acute malnutrition.

Another important lesson learnt was the importance of “resilience” – ensuring people are better able to absorb, recover from, and reduce the threat posed by shocks such as severe droughts.

Since 2011, millions of resilience dollars have poured into Somalia. Most have been invested at the very local level, to construct sustainable water sources, diversify economies, and provide microfinance and training for small businesses.

Gabriella Waaijman, regional director for the Norwegian Refugee Council, said shifting from repetitive crisis-response to longer-term preventive action had made a significant difference in Somalia. As the current drought took hold, “villages with resilience projects were better off,” she told IRIN. “We saw that the first population movements were from villages where such investments had not been made to those where it had.”

Food insecurity projections for February-June 2017 – FAO/IPC

But if resilience has been so successful, how come Somalia’s humanitarian crisis has now spread virtually nationwide?

“The seatbelt has saved a lot of lives,” said Waaijman. “But if you have a head-on collision with a freight train it won’t do you much good.

“We should stay the course. There’s some modest evidence of positive outcomes at the local level, but we’ve only been at it for a couple of years. As long as we don’t say, ‘let’s try something new again’, we have a bit of a chance.”

Solutions?

Joined-up thinking that bridges the historic divide between emergency response and development aid could build better resilience, with investment in infrastructure, agriculture and water resources.

Innovations such as risk insurance and catastrophe bonds also show promise in helping protecting people from the worst when the rains fail or bigger shocks come. And increasing pressure is being brought to bear on donors to provide multi-year financing for longer-term projects on protracted crises.

Cash aid is all the rage and can be extremely effective in providing access to food to people with no money, even by mobile phone. But such payments don’t work so well in parts of South Sudan where road infrastructure is poor and markets are only poorly integrated, even in the dry season, or in areas of Nigeria cut off by Boko Haram. As long as conflict prevents markets from restarting and aid can’t reach those in need, hunger and famine will almost certainly get worse.

“The point is that emergency assistance only helps if people can access it,” Dan Maxwell, who leads the research programme on food security and livelihoods in complex emergencies at the Feinstein International Center, told IRIN. “Resources are critical in all four of these countries, but so is the question of humanitarian access – and of ensuring that warring parties actually respect the rights of people caught in conflict to access assistance, as enshrined in International Humanitarian Law. Beyond adhering to IHL, much more emphasis needs to be put on actually resolving these conflicts – some of which have dragged on for years – and for which any amount of humanitarian assistance is but a palliative.”

Guterres has made early conflict prevention the centrepiece of his reform agenda for the United Nations, but he has had to be frank about the challenges ahead, especially given the Trump administration’s apparent determination to pull the US back from global causes.

“It has proved very difficult to persuade decision-makers at national and international level that prevention must be their priority – perhaps because successful prevention does not attract attention. The television cameras are not there when a crisis is avoided,” he told the Security Council in January.

Even if the TV cameras were there, would anyone be watching? It took a picture of a small dead boy, Alan Kurdi, going viral to wake the world up to the so-called European refugee crisis. In 1984, televised images of emaciated Ethiopian children belatedly spawned pop concerts, chart-toppers, and a global outpouring. What will it take now?

Video: Inside the perfect storm of famine

 

 

oa-am-jf-as/ag

Read More
Uncategorized

We are not the world: Inside the “perfect storm” of famine

Like the four countries facing extreme hunger crises today, the famine that gripped Ethiopia from 1983 to 1985 struggled for attention until it was far too late.

There was conflict. There had been years of consecutive drought – similar to Somalia now. The government spent its money on fighting, not aid. The rich world eventually reacted, with Bob Geldof and Live Aid at the forefront of a public funding campaign. But access in a time of war was hard. By 1984, 200,000 mostly starving Ethiopians had died, young children often the first to go. The final toll was closer to one million.

More than three decades later, the stakes are arguably even higher. A badly strained humanitarian system finds itself facing not one but four vast challenges. In all, more than 20 million people are at risk of starvation and famine across South Sudan, Somalia, Yemen, and northeastern Nigeria.

Much has been learnt since 1984: the value of building resilience before crises arrive, the role climate change plays, the imperative of early conflict prevention, the importance of cash aid, the need to prioritise water as well as food. Nonetheless, the goal posts for those struggling to reach the world’s most vulnerable and provide them with life-saving assistance have shifted far downfield. Why?

The simple answer is conflict. It’s the one symptom that afflicts all four famine-facing regions listed above. And that’s not to mention how the effects of war in places like Iraq and Syria, including the mass migration to Europe, have drained valuable humanitarian resources and donor dollars.

As Nancy Lindborg, president of the US Institute of Peace, pointed out in testimony last week before the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee, “humanitarian assistance flows have shifted from 80 percent of global aid going to victims of natural disasters to now 80 percent going to assist victims of violent conflict.”

Unfortunately, Lindborg’s remarks may well have fallen on deaf ears: President Donald Trump’s administration is threatening draconian cuts to the State Department’s budget, affecting US funding for everything from UN peacekeeping to the United Nations Development Programme and UNICEF.

And garnering the attention required to generate the $4.4 billion the UN says is required by July to stave off a humanitarian “catastrophe” is only part of the battle. Devising the correct response strategy and securing the necessary access in complex and fragmented war zones is likely to be even harder.

These four famines or near-famines do have similarities, but they also have different origins, different trajectories, and therefore different needs. Local factors are at play, with each country prone to its own combination of flaring conflict, weak governance, poor infrastructure, and failing markets.

 

Video: Inside the perfect storm of famine

Inside the “perfect storm” of famine leer_jason_cattle.jpg Special Report Aid and Policy Conflict Food Health Politics and Economics IRIN Africa Somalia South Sudan Cameroon Chad Niger Nigeria Middle East and North Africa Yemen Yemen

Famine hasn’t officially been declared (yet) in Yemen, but, with more hungry people than any of the other big three areas at risk, this feels rather like a technicality.

A reminder of the UN definition: At least 20 percent of households in an area with extreme food shortages and a limited ability to cope; acute malnutrition rates exceed 30 percent; and a death rate exceeding two persons per day per 10,000 persons due to lack of food. As Somalia found out in 2011-2012, famine doesn’t need to have been declared for many to die. Nearly half its starvation deaths occurred before it met this statistical definition, including almost 30,000 children in just three months.

Right now, 17 million of Yemen’s overall population of 27.4 million are classified as food insecure and 3.3 million people, including 2.1 million children, have acute malnutrition. Some half a million children are even worse off – with severe acute malnutrition – UNICEF counts this as a 200 percent increase since 2014.

Yemen’s crisis is entirely man-made (UN relief chief Stephen O’Brien said as much in recent comments). As such, to the few paying attention, it’s been like watching a car crash in slow motion.

 

 

Even before fighting began two years ago, Yemen was a poor country with a chronic hunger problem. But it was, for the most part, manageable: Aid agencies could move about the country with relative ease; most families could buy their meals at market. That was before the Houthi rebels reportedly helped themselves to the reserves in Yemen’s Central Bank, the country’s sole remaining neutral institution. Their rivals, the government and allies of ousted but internationally recognised President Abd Rabbu Mansour Hadi, moved the bank to their southern stronghold of Aden in September, and since then salaries of public sector workers on all sides of the conflict have gone unpaid.

The economy is now in complete freefall, with 80 percent of families in debt. “Middle-class people who used to be able to feed their families no longer have the cash to get food, even when it is available on the open market,” World Food Programme spokeswoman Abeer Etefa explained.

Getting food into Yemen is harder than ever, and becoming pricier too. This matters a great deal in a country that even before this war depended on imports for 90 percent of its food.

Commercial flights aren’t an option – the Saudi Arabia-led coalition has banned them for months. Hodeida port, once the main entry point for cargo ships bringing fuel, food, and medicine, was hit in August 2015. The airstrikes knocked out four of its five functioning cranes.

These days, ships are delayed for weeks at port – if they make it through a UN inspection and a slightly less formal one by the Saudi coalition. Mark Kaye, conflict and humanitarian advocacy advisor for Save the Children, told IRIN the majority of supplies are now unloaded by hand, and that his organisation is finding the private vessels it pays to bring in vital medicines increasingly hesitant to take on the risk.

This is compounded by an uptick of fighting off the coast – the latest example being more than 40 Somalis killed when their boat was struck recently, allegedly by an Apache helicopter.

WFP also struggles with delays (although it has its own ships), and in February it purchased four mobile cranes – to the tune of $3.8 million – meant as a stopgap to “boost the port’s capacity in handling humanitarian cargo”.

A spokesperson told IRIN the vessel carrying the cranes “had been waiting for approval for nearly two weeks to berth [at Hodeida]… but was denied the required security clearances to offload the cranes.” WFP didn’t respond when asked who exactly denied the clearance.

Food insecurity predictions for March-July 2017 – FAO/IPC

So the holdups continue, and they have real consequences. When Save the Children’s medications were delayed at port, Kaye said mobile medical teams “were running at the bare minimum”.

“That means you have to make really tough choices,” he added. “If you are treating the child who comes in and is critical, you can’t treat the child who isn’t critical today but will be next week.”

Once aid makes it into Yemen, it’s a dangerous obstacle course to get it to the most needy, as much of the worst malnutrition is in the areas most heavily impacted by fighting. And some places are under siege, like Taiz city and governorate, making distribution even harder.

“Every party to this conflict makes it extremely difficult for aid agencies and aid workers to get to some parts of the country,” said WFP’s Etefa. She described Yemen, with seven million in need of emergency food assistance to survive, as a “perfect storm… conflict, collapsing economy, limited capacity at ports, [Saudi and internal] blockades, more poverty, and a country that has had chronic hunger problems.”

The unthinkable may be about to get worse. There’s fear ground fighting is headed for Hodeida, potentially giving the Saudi-led coalition a road to the Houthis in Sana’a and shuttering the port completely. This is what keeps humanitarians up at night, and what might just throw Yemen into full-fledged famine.

South Sudan

The South Sudanese government has already declared famine in two counties, and the UN says 5.5 million people will be on the verge of starvation by July if they don’t get food.

There’s a dramatic shortfall of funds to stave off the looming catastrophe, with only 18.5 percent of the appeal funding received so far. But that isn’t South Sudan’s biggest problem. Even if humanitarian agencies get the entire $1.6 billion they’ve asked for this year, they’ll struggle to deliver aid to those most in need.

The country is a bewildering patchwork of armed groups, including various rebel factions as well as the army and government-aligned militias. All sides have engaged in ethnically motivated mass killings, and sexual violence has reached “horrifying” levels, according to the UN.

Aid agencies are forced to take extraordinary measures to try to find people in need and ensure their staff members don’t become casualties too, skirting around armed groups to get aid to people in remote areas.

“We have small planes that land on bush runways. We hire porters to walk for hours and hours and hours to get to these islands where people are hiding, where teams are working,” explained Nicolas Peissel, a project coordinator for Médecins Sans Frontières who has recently been to Leer and Mayendit, the counties, both in rebel-held areas, where famine has been declared.

“We take canoes,” he told IRIN. “There’s one place it takes us over 18 hours to get medicine to them by canoe; so we use whatever is available to us.”

But no amount of precautions can ensure safety for aid workers in South Sudan’s complicated conflict. They have been beaten, kidnapped, and killed.

In one recent attack, unknown men ambushed a team with the International Organization for Migration that was travelling by convoy on its way back from an area where cholera had broken out. Two people died from gunshot wounds and three others were injured.

Then, on 25 March, six more aid workers were killed in an ambush. At least 79 aid workers have been murdered since South Sudan descended into civil war in December 2013.

Such incidents underscore that it’s the war that has caused famine in two counties, and it’s the war that will make it worse.

“Those other areas at risk of famine could have a chance of averting catastrophe if humanitarian access is secured and respected,” the UN’s emergency aid coordination body, OCHA, said in a recent report.

But judging by the actions of both the government and opposition so far, there’s little chance they will suddenly begin to happen.

Speaking to the Security Council on 23 March, UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres noted that the peace process is at a standstill, while government forces have been looting humanitarian compounds and blocking access to people in need. The government has refused to heed warnings from the international community that it must cease such actions to save its people from starvation. “On the contrary, what we hear most often are denials – a refusal by the leadership to even acknowledge the crisis or to fulfil its responsibility to end it,” said Guterres.

Food insecurity projections, February-April 2017 – FAO/IPC

On cue, South Sudan’s representative told the Security Council that his government has cooperated with the UN and its forces have not targeted civilians or perpetrated sexual violence – claims so obviously false they would be laughable if the situation was not so tragic.

So, the government continues down its path of denial as humanitarians wring their hands, and the world’s newest nation staggers inexorably toward a devastating famine.

Northeast Nigeria Families gather for another distribution of cash handouts.

Things are very different in Nigeria. Eight years into the Boko Haram crisis, the momentum of the humanitarian response is finally beginning to build.

But the extent of the problem is huge. Some 5.1 million people are food insecure out of a population of 5.8 million in the three affected northeastern states. But only a fraction – 1.9 million – are being reached.

This is a crisis of both funding and access. Some $1.1 billion is needed this year for humanitarian action, but the response plan has so far received only $160 million. And despite the government’s repeated promise that the insurgency has been broken, the security situation is fluid, limiting the reach of aid workers. That means the humanitarian presence is at its weakest in the areas where it is most urgently needed.

The emergency has been slow to reveal its true scale. Boko Haram was in control of much of the northeast by 2014, effectively locking up the rural population. Those that could escape did, mostly heading to Maiduguri, the capital of Borno State. But little was known of the needs of the many more left behind.

It’s now clear they are substantial. The military’s advance is breaking Boko Haram’s hold, and, as it does, people are emerging, looking for help. “They are hungry and malnourished; some are incoherent; they have clearly been through a lot,” said Malik Samuel, field communications manager for Médecins Sans Frontières.

As the military liberates the last remaining areas of the northeast, along the northern border with Niger, it’s possible that pockets of starving people in localised famines will be found. The aid response is already stretched. Will it be able to cope? Can it be sustained?

The hope is that it will be more effective than last year, when the USAID-funded early warning system, FEWS NET, said that famine had “likely occurred” in Bama and Banki – two towns the military recaptured in 2015.

The army was unable to care for the people arriving from the surrounding countryside. Although Bama is only 74 kilometres from Maiduguri, as many as 2,000 “famine-related deaths” may have occurred. The situation was likely worse outside the town. We don’t know, because the area was deemed too high-risk to venture into by most aid agencies.

Bama is now flooded with aid workers. “The government and NGOs stepped up,” said Samuel. “Across the northeast, the aid response is better.”

It’s certainly more coordinated than it was. There are more skilled staff available, and the at-times tetchy relationship with government authorities has become smoother. But there are still serious gaps. The army nominally controls 23 out of the 27 Local Government Areas in Borno. But its hold is typically restricted to the main town in the area, where the aid operation is based, feeding the displaced who make it out of still-inaccessible rural zones.

“In some [LGAs], there is still not enough food [distributed],” said Adrian Ouvry, regional humanitarian advisor for Mercy Corps. “In some areas, there is not enough fuel wood, so even if you have the food you can’t cook it.”

Food security is also about functioning markets: Farmers need to be able to sell their produce. But those trade links between the towns and the countryside have been severed by the conflict. Boko Haram turned to requisitioning the food it needed, and as a result farmers planted less and less.

The government’s counter-insurgency approach also deepened the isolation of the rural population. Fearful of Boko Haram’s mobility and the threat of infiltration, it banned fuel sales and restricted movement. The closure of the borders – where it could be enforced – also hit agricultural trade, especially the once-thriving livestock business that historically stretched as far as Central African Republic.

Nigeria is in recession as a result of slumping oil prices and the naira’s freefalling exchange rate against the dollar. Year-on-year inflation hit 19 percent in January, pushing up prices of local and imported staples. This is also being felt keenly in neighbouring Sahelian countries that are struggling already and depend on smuggled Nigerian produce.

Some 1.8 million people are displaced in the three northeastern states of Adamawa, Borno, and Yobe. The bulk are in Maiduguri, whose population has doubled to two million. Rather than settling in poorly serviced official camps, more than 80 percent of these victims of the war live with friends and relatives in the community, further straining households.

Food insecurity projections for June-August 2017 – FAO/IPC

Nigeria’s northeast had always been food secure and self-sufficient. But for a third consecutive year farmers have been unable to return to the land for the planting season. The Borno State government, possibly as a sign of frustration, has called for IDPs to head back to their homes by 29 May.

This is widely seen as an impossible goal given the insecurity, the lack of government services, and the deliberate destruction of infrastructure by Boko Haram, which, according to the World Bank, includes 30 percent of homes in Borno.

The best that could be achieved would be the return of people to the largest towns in the LGAs, but this only relocates the problem of caring for those in need to strained urban centres.

The Nigerian government has given assurances that nobody will be forced to move against their will. That is not the case with neighbouring Cameroon, which is “deporting Nigerians on a daily basis”, said MSF’s Samuel. This is despite a tripartite agreement, also signed by the UN’s refugee agency (UNHCR), that forbids refoulement. Nigerians are being forced onto trucks and dumped on the border, where they have a long wait – sometimes weeks – before they receive any assistance.

It’s a reminder that this is a regional emergency. Boko Haram attacks have spilled over into Chad, Niger, and Cameroon, all of which are sheltering Nigerian refugees and their own displaced as a result of the violence. And this is a fragile Sahelian zone, also grappling with the growing impact of climate change and endemic poverty.

Somalia

“Here we go again” might be a typical reaction to the slow-motion disaster that has left 5.5 million people in urgent need of food aid in Somalia.

Drought? Check. Conflict? Check. Rampant poverty and underdevelopment? Check. An international appeal for almost a billion dollars? Check again. So is this a repeat of 2011, when a famine claimed around 250,000 lives? There are several parallels, but also some significant differences, both in the context on the ground and in the humanitarian response.

The drought itself is worse and has lasted much longer than the one that preceded the 2011 famine. Of the four countries highlighted, only in Somalia is there a drought. Almost the whole country has suffered near-total crop failure, leading to sharp price rises; some grains cost double what they did a year ago. Livestock herds – the equivalent of bank accounts for many – are dying in vast numbers, with widespread sickness driving down the value of surviving animals. The cost of labour, meanwhile, has plummeted. All this means households have considerably less money to buy food that is a lot more expensive. 

Large swathes of the country where the food crisis is at its worst, such as in the Bay, Bakool, and Juba regions, where al-Shabab is the de facto authority, are no-go areas for almost all aid agencies, who are denied permission to work there or simply not allowed through checkpoints. The security risks to aid workers in Somalia are also very real: last year there were 165 violent incidents and 16 aid workers killed.

But inaccessibility and al-Shabab’s presence are not the only factors at play. The adjoining regions of Sool and Sanaag are in the second most severe category of food insecurity but they lie well north of the Islamist group’s main theatre of operations, between the self-declared independent state of Somaliland and Puntland, a semi-autonomous region. Drought there has been especially fierce, while there has been very little investment in resilience projects and humanitarian presence is minimal (unlike in Somalia as a whole, where more than 300 different relief agencies operate).

Across Somalia, access is generally better than it was in 2011, with an atomised humanitarian presence in aid hubs from which surrounding villages can be reached. This is one reason why today’s map of food insecurity, despite the more severe drought, is less alarming than that of four years ago.  

The response to that disaster was widely derided as too little much too late and led to considerable soul-searching and the drawing up of “lessons learned”. Chief among these was a determination to ensure that, come the next crisis, aid would be delivered from points much closer to people in need. Mobile health clinics, which play a key role in addressing acute malnutrition and drought-related diseases such as cholera, will, funding permitting, reach further and wider than previously.

The UN’s Operational Plan for Pre-Famine Scale-Up of Humanitarian Assistance calls for some 4.6 million Somalis to be given access to health services. And the scaling-up of cash-based programming – which accounts for half the planned food response, with the food itself provided by the private sector – is another example of more proximate delivery. In many cases, this assistance arrives directly to people’s phones via mobile money services.

Additional components of the plan include targeting 200,000 severely malnourished children with therapeutic interventions (such as peanut pastes) and a further two million children for treatment and prevention of moderate acute malnutrition.

Another important lesson learnt was the importance of “resilience” – ensuring people are better able to absorb, recover from, and reduce the threat posed by shocks such as severe droughts.

Since 2011, millions of resilience dollars have poured into Somalia. Most have been invested at the very local level, to construct sustainable water sources, diversify economies, and provide microfinance and training for small businesses.

Gabriella Waaijman, regional director for the Norwegian Refugee Council, said shifting from repetitive crisis-response to longer-term preventive action had made a significant difference in Somalia. As the current drought took hold, “villages with resilience projects were better off,” she told IRIN. “We saw that the first population movements were from villages where such investments had not been made to those where it had.”

Food insecurity projections for February-June 2017 – FAO/IPC

But if resilience has been so successful, how come Somalia’s humanitarian crisis has now spread virtually nationwide?

“The seatbelt has saved a lot of lives,” said Waaijman. “But if you have a head-on collision with a freight train it won’t do you much good.

“We should stay the course. There’s some modest evidence of positive outcomes at the local level, but we’ve only been at it for a couple of years. As long as we don’t say, ‘let’s try something new again’, we have a bit of a chance.”

Solutions?

Joined-up thinking that bridges the historic divide between emergency response and development aid could build better resilience, with investment in infrastructure, agriculture and water resources.

Innovations such as risk insurance and catastrophe bonds also show promise in helping protecting people from the worst when the rains fail or bigger shocks come. And increasing pressure is being brought to bear on donors to provide multi-year financing for longer-term projects on protracted crises.

Cash aid is all the rage and can be extremely effective in providing access to food to people with no money, even by mobile phone. But such payments don’t work so well in parts of South Sudan where road infrastructure is poor and markets are only poorly integrated, even in the dry season, or in areas of Nigeria cut off by Boko Haram. As long as conflict prevents markets from restarting and aid can’t reach those in need, hunger and famine will almost certainly get worse.

“The point is that emergency assistance only helps if people can access it,” Dan Maxwell, who leads the research programme on food security and livelihoods in complex emergencies at the Feinstein International Center, told IRIN. “Resources are critical in all four of these countries, but so is the question of humanitarian access – and of ensuring that warring parties actually respect the rights of people caught in conflict to access assistance, as enshrined in International Humanitarian Law. Beyond adhering to IHL, much more emphasis needs to be put on actually resolving these conflicts – some of which have dragged on for years – and for which any amount of humanitarian assistance is but a palliative.”

Guterres has made early conflict prevention the centrepiece of his reform agenda for the United Nations, but he has had to be frank about the challenges ahead, especially given the Trump administration’s apparent determination to pull the US back from global causes.

“It has proved very difficult to persuade decision-makers at national and international level that prevention must be their priority – perhaps because successful prevention does not attract attention. The television cameras are not there when a crisis is avoided,” he told the Security Council in January.

Even if the TV cameras were there, would anyone be watching? It took a picture of a small dead boy, Alan Kurdi, going viral to wake the world up to the so-called European refugee crisis. In 1984, televised images of emaciated Ethiopian children belatedly spawned pop concerts, chart-toppers, and a global outpouring. What will it take now?

Video: Inside the perfect storm of famine

 

 

oa-am-jf-as/ag

Read More
Uncategorized

Answer – Contributions showered upon African states – E-000071/2017

By the end of 2016, projects and programmes committed for Africa under the 11th European Development Fund — EDF attained the overall amount of EUR 6.4 billion, including around EUR 2 billion in November and December. These concerned measures in 16 countries, 3 regions — Central, West and Eastern/Southern Africa, and the Intra-ACP (Africa, Caribbean and Pacific), with at least 35% of the amount devoted to governance issues e.g. in Benin, Nigeria and Tanzania.

The Commission generally ensures a strict qualitative and quantitative monitoring of its activities across all instruments, countries and regions, and sectors of intervention. Information on the audit and control approach used for external action is publicly available(1) as it is the case for information on the EU approach to reports, audits and discharge(2).

More specifically, governance and rule of law issues receive focused support in at least 28 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa (e.g. Ghana, Liberia, Cameroon, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Eritrea, Kenya, Mozambique, Lesotho) including through budget support programmes. The latter are specifically designed to improve country systems, including public financial management, to improve transparency, accountability and to fight against corruption. It allows the Commission to monitor budget allocation and execution of partner countries and engage in policy dialogue on reforms. Risks and results are systematically monitored and risk mitigating measures are applied.

While supporting the strengthening of partner countries’ oversight bodies, the Commission is regularly the object of scrutiny by the European Court of Auditors (e.g. annual and special reports) and the European Parliament itself (e.g. discharge procedure).

(1) https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/funding/about-funding-and-procedures/audit-and-control_en
(2) http://ec.europa.eu/budget/explained/reports_control/index_en.cfm
Read More

Africa Mobile Phone Accessories Market Poised to Register a CAGR of 6.3% by 2026

The Africa Mobile Phone Accessories market is anticipated to grow from US$ 2,315.9 Mn in 2016 to US$ 4,060.2 Mn by 2026, registering a CAGR of 5.8% in terms of revenue during the forecast period (2016-2026) � according to a new report Mobile Phone Accessories Market: Africa Industry Analysis and Opportunity Assessment, 2016�2026 published by Future Market Insights. In this report, the Africa mobile phone accessories market is tracked in terms of value and volume, and is calibrated to obtain market revenue estimates.

According to Future Market Insights, Increasing disposable income and rapid urbanisation are factors anticipated to drive growth of the Africa mobile phone accessories market over the forecast period. Increased internet usage and smartphone penetration, along with a robust growth of m-commerce is further expected to push the demand for mobile phone accessories in Africa during the forecast period. The report also identifies factors likely to hamper the growth of the Africa mobile phone accessories market. Poor economic conditions and an established market captured by Chinese vendors are some of the major challenges expected to be faced by market players in the Africa mobile phone accessories market during the forecast period.

The overall Africa mobile phone accessories market is segmented on the basis of type, price, distribution channel, and region. The report provides market data in terms of value and volume and forecasts projections for the period 2016-2026.

Segmentation highlights

In 2015, the protective cases segment dominated the Africa mobile phone accessories market, followed by the headphones & earphones However, Future Market Insights analysts predict the power bank segment to expand at the fastest CAGR of 6.8% over the forecast period in terms of revenue. Demand for power banks is estimated to witness the highest growth rate by 2016 � frequent power cuts in certain parts of Africa is a key factor likely to boost this demand.

The mid-priced segment is expected to expand at the highest CAGR of 6.2% in terms of value during the forecast period. In terms of market share, the low-priced segment alone accounted for more than one-third of the revenue share of the overall market in 2015 and Future Market Insights analysts feel this segment will dominate the Africa mobile phone accessories market in the coming 10 years.

The online store segment is expected to expand at the highest CAGR of 7.2% in terms of value during the forecast period. In terms of market share, the multi-brand store segment alone accounted for more than one-third of the revenue share of the overall market in 2015 and is expected to dominate the Africa mobile phone accessories market between 2016 and 2026.

Regional forecast

In terms of region, Future Market Insights sees great potential in the Rest of Africa region, a segment that dominated the overall Africa mobile phone accessories market in 2015, accounting for more than one-third of the total market share. This segment is expected to be the largest revenue generator for mobile phone accessories in Africa by 2016, accounting for a revenue share of 44.1% by the end of 2016. The mobile phone accessories market in South Africa is projected to expand at the highest CAGR during the forecast period.

Vendor insights

Future Market Insights forecasts a very promising scenario for key players operating in the Africa mobile phone accessories market over the next 10 years. Analysts are of the opinion that innovation in new product offerings and services will be a critical lever for companies such as Case-Mate, Muvit, and Mozo Accessories to consolidate their market position and establish a solid customer base.

Visit For More Information: http://www.futuremarketinsights.com/reports/sample/rep-af-1885

Media Contact: Yogesh Sengar

Designation: Associate Consultant

Company / Organization: Future Market Insights

Phone: +13479183531

Fax:

Email: yogesh@futuremarketinsights.com

Website: http://www.futuremarketinsights.com

Address: 616 Corporate Way, Suite 2-9018, Valley Cottage, NY

Read More